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Parents with Mental Disabilities: The Legal Landscape
Dale Margolin Cecka, JD
“It is better for all the world, if . . . society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.” (Justice Holmes, Buck v.
Bell, 1927)
In the first part of the twentieth century,
individuals with mental disabilities were
sterilized by institutions to prevent them from
having offspring (Dowdney & Skuse, 1993).
Although we have abandoned this as public
policy, parents with mental disabilities still
lose custody of their children at much higher
rates than their non-disabled peers (National
Technical Assistance for State Mental Health
Planning, 2000).

Overview

The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
The ADA was enacted in 1990 to remedy
discrimination against individuals with
disabilities (ADA, 2006). Over 54 million
Americans are protected under the ADA
(Office on Disability, 2005). Title II of the
ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability by a public entity, which includes
(1) any state or local government, and (2)
any department, agency, special purpose
district, or other instrumentality of a state or
states or local government. According to its
regulations, the ADA applies to “all services,
programs, and activities provided or made
available by public entities.”
The ADA requires that “a public
entity ... make reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures when
the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability.” Title
II of the ADA does not require public entities
to make “fundamental alterations” to the
nature of their programs or services.
A state’s department of social services
is a public entity and when it initiates
a termination of parental rights (TPR)
proceeding, it should be considered state
activity. Reunification and family preservation
services should also be considered services,
programs, or activities which may need to
be “reasonably modified” in order for states
to provide equal access to parents with
disabilities.
Federal and state courts, however, have
consistently held that the ADA does not
apply to parents facing TPRs. The reasons
include: (1) TPR proceedings are not a
“service, program or activity” within the
meaning of the ADA (see In re Adoption of
Gregory, 2001; In the Matter of Terry, 2000;
In re Antony B, 1999; In the Interest of B. K.

F., 1997; and In re B. S., 1997); (2) a juvenile
court’s jurisdiction cannot interpret a federal
law or conduct “an open-ended inquiry into
how the parents might respond to alternative
services and why those services have not

Dependency of C. C., 1999; J. T. v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services, 1997; In
re Karrlo K., 1994; and In the Matter of K.
D. W., 1994). Still, those courts have ruled
that sufficient reasonable modifications in

State child welfare laws require reasonable efforts in order to comply
with the [Adoption and Safe Families Act]. ...The state laws also do not
specifically require the reasonable efforts to be tailored to meet the needs
of parents with disabilities.

been provided” (see In re B. S., 1997; In
the Interest of Torrance P., 1994; and In re
Maryia R., 1997); and (3) Title II provides
plaintiffs with a private right of action against
a public entity but cannot be used as a legal
defense (In re Doe, 2002; In the Matter of
Rodriguez, 1999).
A handful of courts have allowed the
ADA to be a defense to a TPR (see In the
Matter of John D., 1997), some without
specifically ruling on its applicability (e.g.
In the Matter of J. B., 1996; In re Caresse B.,
1997; In the Interest of C. C., 1995; In re

family preservation services were made to
accommodate individuals’ mental disabilities,
and therefore no ADA violations occurred.
One exception was In the Interest of K. K.
W. (1995), where the courts found that
the state violated the ADA by failing to
modify its reunification services to assure
equally effective services to a parent with
schizophrenia: the state provided only services
that are offered to parents without disabilities.
According to a few courts, the ADA can
be raised in child welfare proceedings but only
prior to a TPR proceeding. In the interest of S.
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The Adoption and Safe Families
Act (ASFA) & “Reasonable Efforts”
Requirements Under State Law
In addition to the ADA’s reasonable
modification requirement, the federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA)
requires states to make “reasonable efforts”
to preserve and reunify families in order to
prevent or eliminate the removal of a child
(ASFA, 1997). State child welfare laws require
reasonable efforts in order to comply with
ASFA. ASFA does not provide a private
right of action for parents to enforce these
“reasonable efforts” laws (Suter v. Artist M.,
1992). The state laws also do not specifically
require the reasonable efforts to be tailored
to meet the needs of parents with disabilities.
Arkansas is the only exception: its statute
does require the state to make reasonable
accommodations in accordance with the ADA
to parents with disabilities (Ark Code Ann.
§ 9-27-341). Advocates can attempt to argue
that services are not “reasonable” if they do

not take into account a parent’s disability.
However, most courts, including most cited
in this article, “rubber stamp” reasonable
efforts even when they appear to be ill-suited
to a particular parent.
There have been some exceptions (see
In re Adoption/Guardianship, 2002; Mary
Ellen C. v. Arizona Department of Economic
Security, 1999; In re the Dependency of H.
W. & V. W., 1998; and In re Victoria M.,
1989). These courts have examined whether
the “reasonable efforts” were appropriate to
the needs of parents with disabilities. The
decisions also required child welfare agencies
to work with the developmental disabilities
or mental health service system. In In re P. A.
B. (1990), the court reversed a termination
order because the bond between parents with
mental disabilities and their children had
not been considered by the trial court before
terminating rights. In Division of Family
Services v. Murphy (2000), the court allowed
two parents with mental disabilities to regain
custody of their children because, by working
together, they could adequately address the
needs of their children. The court also noted
that even though parents might require
agency assistance from time to time, their
children should not be placed in foster care.

Some appeals courts have also reversed
TPRs where courts made decisions based
on stereotypes about individuals with
disabilities. For example, In re C. W. (2007)
found that the trial court inappropriately
relied on an outdated psychiatric assessment
when terminating a mother’s rights. Without
expert testimony about the mother’s current
mental health status or the child’s needs, the
court’s decision emanated from assumptions
and speculation. (See also In re Adoption/
Guardianship, 2002.)

Conclusion
The ADA, coupled with federal and state
child welfare laws, provides broad brush
strokes for advocates of parents with mental
disabilities and their children. To effectuate
parents’ rights, child welfare professionals
must work with the parents themselves, as
well as with other state departments, to form
service plans that are tailored for the success
of each individual family.

Dale Margolin Cecka, JD is Associate
Clinical Professor of Law and Director of
the Family Law Clinic at the University of
Richmond. She can be reached via email
at dmargoli@richmond.edu.

School of Social Work
M.S.W. and Ph.D. programs

Preparing

professionals
SSW

AD comingto be
leaders

for a

just and caring society
www.cehd.umn.edu/ssw

Overview

L. P (1999) held that the issues of adequate
services and reasonable accommodations for
parents with disabilities need to be addressed
at review hearings or when they are offered,
and that it is too late to challenge the service
plan at the TPR proceeding. (See also In the
Matter of Terry, 2000; In the Interest of A. M.,
1999; Stone v. Daviess, 1995; In re Antony B.,
1999; In re B. S., 1997; In re M. J. M., 2002;
and In the Matter of Terry, 2000). But at least
one court has held that the ADA may not be
raised in dependency proceedings either: In
M. C. v. Department of Children & Families
(2000), the court found that dependency
proceedings are held for the benefit of the
child, not the parent, and therefore the
ADA may not be used as a defense in such
proceedings.
Thus far, courts that find the ADA
applicable to child welfare cases usually do not
hold agencies accountable for offering unique
services to parents with mental disabilities
(see In the Matter of Terry, 2000; In the Matter
of the Welfare of H. S., 1999; In re Caresse B.,
1997; and Bartley v. State, 1996). Courts seem
to have made the assumption that this would
fundamentally alter a state’s child welfare
program, presumably because of financial or
other burdens. However, advocates for parents
can counter this argument (Margolin, 2007).
Many alternative services actually save the
state money in the long run. The question
of an undue financial burden is a factspecific inquiry; under the ADA, there is no
justification for a total absence of services that
actually help parents with mental disabilities.
Parents with disabilities are entitled to services
that have the same potential, with or without
reasonable modification, for facilitating
reunification as parents without disabilities.
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